In Greer v. FAM Networks, LLC, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 04039 (1st Dept. June 25, 2026), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that a complaint alleging breach of a media exploitation agreement sufficiently pleaded the elements of a contract claim by identifying the agreement, claiming performance, alleging nonpayment and failure to account, and asserting resulting damages.

Summary judgment in lieu of a complaint under CPLR 3213 was central to the decision in Newmark Partners, L.P. v. Singer, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03923 (1st Dept. June 23, 2026), the subject of today’s article, where the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the enforcement of a settlement agreement arising from a failed $13 million transaction.

Implied‑in‑fact contracts under New York law arise from conduct rather than explicit agreement, requiring objective evidence of mutual assent, definite terms, and an intent to be bound. They are fully enforceable but subject to important limitations, including the preclusive effect of governing express contracts.

Merger clauses and the duplication of claims doctrine often operate to limit the availability of fraudulent inducement claims alongside breach of contract claims.

Contract interpretation principles require courts to give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the plain language of their agreement, while reading the contract as a whole and avoiding constructions that render provisions meaningless.

In today’s article, we examine Kingdom Assoc., Inc. v. WBC Servs. Inc., 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03070 (1st Dept. May 14, 2026), a case arising from a proposed subcontract for excavation and foundation work on a New York City project.

Contracts are intended to bring certainty and clarity to commercial relationships, yet disputes often arise when written terms leave room for more than one reasonable interpretation. Under New York law, the question of ambiguity can determine whether a case is resolved on the face of the agreement or proceeds into litigation over extrinsic evidence and party intent.

In Kassirer v. Gotlib, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02154 (1st Dept. Apr. 9, 2026), the Appellate Division, First Department, reaffirmed a bedrock principle of New York contract law: agreements to agree are not enforceable.

In today’s article, we discuss how courts interpret arbitration clauses in contracts by focusing on Perle Tech. Inc. v. United Apollo Intl. Inc., a case recently decided in Supreme Court, Kings County. Despite the use of the word “may” in the arbitration clause, the court held that arbitration was mandatory, not permissive, due to other contract provisions indicating clear intent to arbitrate.

In Bardy v. Bonnem, the plaintiff sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement for an ownership option in a drive-thru coffee business. The motion court upheld the agreement based on an email proposal orally accepted by the plaintiff and partial performance. On appeal, the Second Department modified the motion court’s order, finding the email lacked essential terms to satisfy New York’s Statute of Frauds (GOL § 5-701) and that the contract could not be performed within one yea

Generally speaking, a party is bound by the terms of a contract[1] to which it is a party. Thus, contracts should be enforced according to their terms when they are “clear and unambiguous”.This is so even when a party fails to read the contract prior to executing same (Id. at 5,*7 and 11) or if the signer does not understand the English language.

A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do something (e.g., provide goods or services) in exchange for a benefit. When one or more parties to a contract fail to perform a term in their agreement, they are in breach of that agreement.