In New York, the equity of redemption is a long standing common law right that allows those with certain interests in real property to redeem mortgaged property and prevent a foreclosure sale by tendering the full amount due at any time before the foreclosure sale.

On April 14, 2026, the Appellate Division, First Department issued a decision in which it reiterated the limits of fraud claims in the corporate governance context. In Massoumi v. Ganju, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02208 (1st Dept. Apr. 14, 2026), the Court unanimously affirmed summary judgment dismissing fraud claims brought by a former chief executive officer who alleged that his fellow executives and directors misled him in advance of a board meeting that resulted in his removal.

In Kassirer v. Gotlib, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02154 (1st Dept. Apr. 9, 2026), the Appellate Division, First Department, reaffirmed a bedrock principle of New York contract law: agreements to agree are not enforceable.

Courts will dismiss breach of contract claims based on nondisclosure agreements where the plaintiff fails to identify specific confidential information allegedly misused. And fraud claims fail as a matter of law when a sophisticated party relies on oral assurances contradicted by written disclosures.

Financial abuse of seniors and other vulnerable adults is among the most damaging and the least visible forms of investor harm. It arises when age, illness, cognitive decline, or dependence on trusted professionals erodes an individual’s ability to evaluate advice or resist coercion, even while legal capacity nominally remains intact.

In prior BLOG articles, we discussed the court’s power to toll the accrual of interest in mortgage foreclosure actions.

New York limits judicial intrusion into arbitration awards, reflecting the core principles of finality, deference to arbitrators’ rulings, and the narrow grounds for vacatur under CPLR 7511.

In today’s article, we examine the elements and heightened pleading requirements for fraudulent inducement claims under New York law, with a focus on the justifiable reliance element.

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger A basic tenet of contract interpretation is that “agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.” Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc. , 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002) (citations omitted); see also SM Owner, LLC v. Envoy Towers Co., L.P. , 245 A.D.3d 973 (2 nd Dept. 2026). It is equally fundamental that the “best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing.” Greenfield , 98 N.Y.2d at 569 ( quotin

In Kim v. XP Sec., LLC, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of summary judgment in a wrongful termination action, reiterating settled principles of contract interpretation: clear, unambiguous agreements between sophisticated, counseled parties are enforced according to their plain meaning, without recourse to extrinsic evidence.

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In Minihane v. Brown , 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01505 (2d Dept. Mar. 18, 2026), the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed when the statute of limitations begins to run on a demand promissory note. The defendant borrowed $19,000 pursuant to a note that provided repayment was due only upon written demand, which could be made no earlier than January 1, 2015. Although the lender did not make a demand until September 2023, the borrower argued that the six

By Jonathan H. Freiberger On March 17, 2026, the Appellate Division, First Department, decided HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Nicholas , a mortgage foreclosure action that addresses many of the issues raised in our prior BLOG articles. HSBC involves the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (“FAPA”), and the statute of limitations in foreclosure actions. By way of brief background, FAPA went into effect in December of 2022, and “represents the Legislature’s response to litigation strat

Under Limited Liability Company Law §  609(a), a member or manager of a limited liability company is not personally liable for the LLC’s debts, obligations, or liabilities solely by reason of being a member or acting in that capacity. Applying this rule, the courts in 27-21 27th St. Sponsors, LLC v. Kanta , 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01273 (1st Dept. Mar. 05, 2026), held that a minority member of an LLC could not be sued individually for the LLC’s obligations, as the operating agreem

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Financial exploitation of seniors and vulnerable adults is a significant problem.¹ It is considered by many to be an insidious non-violent form of elder abuse in the United States. While a landmark MetLife study initially estimated that older Americans lose roughly $2.6 to $2.9 billion each year to financial exploitation, more recent research suggests that the cost may be materially higher, potentially exceeding $36 billion annually. These numbers, whethe

By: Jeffrey M. Haber As readers of this Blog know, affinity fraud and Ponzi schemes often intersect because each reinforces the weaknesses of the other, creating a powerful and deceptive form of financial exploitation.¹ Affinity fraud is a form of financial deception that exploits the trust and social cohesion within a close‑knit group. These groups may be defined by shared religious beliefs, cultural or ethnic identity, professional affiliations, or community networks. The f

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger This BLOG has written numerous articles addressing statutes of limitation.¹ Today’s article discusses Mark v. Trimarco , a case decided by the Appellate Division, Second Department, on February 4, 2026, in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to breathe new life into an otherwise expired limitations period to sue on a promissory note. The statute of limitations on a promissory note is six years. CPLR 213(2) ; see also Carpenito v. Linksman ,

By: Jeffrey M. Haber The doctrine of frustration of purpose is narrowly applied.¹ “In order to invoke the doctrine of frustration of purpose, the frustrated purpose must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understood, without it, the transaction would have made little sense.”² In other words, the doctrine will not apply “unless the frustration is substantial.”³ However, “frustration of purpose … is not available where the event which prevented pe

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Liability for aiding and abetting a fraud is distinct from liability for committing the underlying fraud itself. This theory of liability recognizes that a defendant may substantially contribute to fraudulent misconduct without personally making any misrepresentation/omission or directly deceiving the plaintiff. Thus, instead of requiring proof that the defendant was the maker of a false statement or omission, an aiding‑and‑abetting theory turns on wheth