Mortgage Foreclosure

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger On January 28, 2026, the Appellate Division, Second Department, decided Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Starr , a mortgage foreclosure action that addresses many of the issues raised in our prior BLOG articles. The borrower in Starr allegedly defaulted in her repayment obligations under a promissory note secured by a mortgage on real property. In 2009, the lender commenced a mortgage foreclosure action (the “First Action”). In 2010, the Fi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) and Generative Artificial Intelligence (“GenAI”) are all the rage these days. While AI and GenAI can be useful tools, caution is necessary when using such tools. Today we will discuss Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Letennier , a case decided by the Appellate Division, Third Department, on January 8, 2026. The Court described the decision as the “first appellate-level case in New York addressing sanctions for the m

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger This BLOG has previously addressed the issue of a defendant’s appearance in an action – both formal and informal. In that regard, we have noted that it makes sense that a “plaintiff appears in an action merely by bringing it.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Hall , 185 A.D.3d 1006 (2 nd Dep’t 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once served with process, a defendant must appear in an action to avoid a default. Section 320(a) of N

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In New York, foreign business entities – e.g. , corporations, limited liability companies, and partnerships authorized to do business in another jurisdiction or country – are required to register to do business with the Secretary of State. The failure to receive such authority deprives the foreign entity of the ability to affirmatively access the courts of New York and subjects any action commenced by the foreign entity to dismissal. The purpose of the r

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Last Week in our BLOG article: “ Just When You Thought It Could Not Get More Unanimous, The Court of Appeals Determines that FAPA’s Retroactive Application Does Not Violate the Due Process or Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution or the Right to Substantive and Procedural Due Process Under the New York Constitution – Part 1 ,” we discussed FAPA and the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, N. A. , in which the Co

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Last Week in our BLOG article: “ It’s Unanimous – The Fourth Department Joins the Other Departments and Confirms the Retroactive Application of FAPA ,” we again discussed FAPA and noted that on November 25, 2025, the New York Court of Appeals decided two cases: Article 13 LLC v. Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank , and Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, N. A. , in which the Court determined that retroactive application of FAPA’s provisions passes constitutional muster und

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger oday’s article is about MCLP Asset Co. v. Zaveri , an action that involves numerous areas of the law about which we frequently write -- mortgage foreclosure, FAPA, CPLR 205(a), CPLR 205-A and statutes of limitation. Statute of Limitations in Foreclosure Actions By way of brief background, and as previously written in this BLOG, an action to foreclose a mortgage is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. CPLR 213(4) ; see also Medina v. Bank

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger On October 31, 2025, the Supreme Court, Kings County, decided loanDepot.com LLC v. Ortner , a case addressing the meaning of the “taking proceedings” requirement of CPLR 3215(c) . By way of brief background, when a defendant defaults in appearing in an action, CPLR 3215(c) requires that the plaintiff act promptly to secure a default judgment. As previously discussed in prior BLOG articles, CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that: If the pla

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article addresses M & T Bank v. Givens , a case decided on October 15, 2025, by the Appellate Division, Second Department. Givens addresses three issues encountered in mortgage foreclosure actions: motions for extensions of time pursuant to CPLR 2004 , the 90-day requirement to conduct foreclosure sales pursuant to RPAPL 1351(1) and the tolling of interest due to a lender’s delays in prosecuting its foreclosure action. CPLR 2004 CPLR 2004

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s BLOG deals with the “Relation Back Doctrine” (the “Doctrine”) , which, inter alia , “allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended filing to relate back to claims previously asserted against a codefendant for Statute of Limitations purposes where the two defendants are “‘united in interest.’” Buran v. Coupal , 87 N.Y.2d 173, 177 (1995) (citation omitted). The Doctrine was codified by the CPLR. See, e.g., CPLR 203(b), (c), (e) and

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Appearing in an action may give rise to a waiver of a litigant’s right to challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the litigant. As explained in prior blog articles, it is axiomatic that a “plaintiff appears merely by bringing it.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Hall , 185 A.D.3d 1006, 1007 (2 nd Dep’t 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once served with process, a defendant must appear in an action to avoid a default. CPLR 320

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger This BLOG has written extensively on a wide variety of issues in the area of mortgage foreclosure. One particular area that has been the subject of numerous articles is RPAPL 1304 . By way of brief background, and as addressed in numerous prior BLOG articles, the Second Department has stated that an “RPAPL 1304 notice is a notice pursuant to the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act ( Real Property Law § 265-a ), the underlying purpose of which is to a

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger This BLOG frequently writes about mortgage foreclosure, generally, and RPAPL 1304 , specifically. By way of brief background, and as addressed in numerous prior BLOG articles, the Second Department has stated that an “RPAPL 1304 notice is a notice pursuant to the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act ( Real Property Law § 265-a ), the underlying purpose of which is to afford greater protections to homeowners confronted with foreclosure.” Wells Fargo Ban

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger In today’s Blog, we revisit the requirement in RPAPL 1351(1) that a foreclosure sale occur within 90 days of the date of the judgment of foreclosure and sale. By way of brief background, and as previously discussed in this BLOG, the 90-day requirement became effective in December of 2016. However, the rule does not apply in situations where the sale occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Peralta , 191 A.D.3d 924,

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger In today’s article, we will discuss Yesmin v. Aliobaba, LLC , an Opinion and Order rendered on May 14, 2025, in which the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that “a notice of pendency that was unexpired at the time of the foreclosure sale has no effect on the title acquired by a good faith purchaser for value from a sale conducted pursuant to the judgment of foreclosure and sale.” By way of brief background, the borrower in Yesmin secured

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article relates to a decision in a mortgage foreclosure action that combines numerous concepts about which we have previously written. We will quickly revisit CPLR 3215(c) , which provides, in pertinent part, that: If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article revisits statute of limitations issues and FAPA in residential mortgage foreclosure actions . Briefly stated, a mortgage foreclosure action is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. CPLR 213(4) ; see also Anglestone Real Estate Venture Partners Corp. v. Bank of New York Melon , 221 A.D.3d 943, 946 (2 nd Dep’t 2023). When mortgage payments are payable in installments, the six-year period runs from each missed payment, but, u

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article addresses a property owner’s right to cancel a recorded mortgage pursuant to RPAPL 1501(4) and whether a mortgagee is “is entitled to recover sums expended to preserve and maintain an allegedly abandoned property under equitable and quasi-contractual theories.” As discussed in prior articles, mortgages on real property are frequently delivered to lenders to stand as security for the repayment obligations evidenced by a promissory no

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger There are certain categories of individuals and entities that are required to be named as defendants in mortgage foreclosure actions and the failure to name such “necessary defendants” can have serious implications. New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1311 , which sets forth such “necessary defendants,” provides: Each of the following persons, whose interest is claimed to be subject and subordinate to the plaintiff's lien, shall

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article relates to CPLR 321(c) , a topic we have addressed before < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . As previously discussed in this BLOG, once an attorney appears and becomes the attorney of record, the client is free to change counsel by filing with the clerk, a substitution of counsel stipulation, which must also be served on “the attorneys for all parties in the action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the par