Today’s article addresses whether a party that settles an action that is discontinued, can revive same by motion in the discontinued action, or is required to commence a new plenary action.

According to the “American Rule,” “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorney fee from the loser.”

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is grounded in the principle that disputes, once fully and fairly adjudicated, should not be relitigated. New York courts apply a broad transactional approach to claim preclusion, barring not only claims that were actually litigated in a prior action, but also those that could have been raised in that action.

The death of a litigant during the pendency of a lawsuit is not uncommon. In this BLOG’s “Death of a Litigant,” we discussed the ramifications of such a death.

As discussed previously in this BLOG, and most recently in “You Can’t Always Waive Bye-Bye to Statutes of Limitations,” statutes of limitation govern the time in which a cause of action must be interposed after accrual. Article 2 of the CPLR addresses statute of limitations issues in New York.

In general, statutes of limitation govern the time in which a cause of action must be interposed after accrual.

Today’s BLOG deals with the “Relation-Back Doctrine” (the “Doctrine”)[1], which, inter alia, “allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended filing to relate back to claims previously asserted against a codefendant for Statute of Limitations purposes where the two defendants are “‘united in interest.’”

When a court issues a decision and order that is self-effectuating, nothing further from the parties is required. Sometimes, however, a court’s decision will direct that the prevailing party either: (a) submit an order or judgment for the court to consider; or, (b) submit or settle an order or judgment, on notice, for the court’s consideration.

CPLR 3215(c) mandates dismissal of a complaint as abandoned if a plaintiff fails to take proceedings for a default judgment within one year of a defendant’s default, unless “sufficient cause” (a reasonable excuse and potentially meritorious claim) is shown. Recent cases clarify what qualifies as “taking proceedings.”

CPLR 322(a) permits a defendant in an action affecting title to real property to demand proof that the plaintiff’s counsel was authorized to commence the action.

RPAPL 1304 requires that at least ninety days before commencing legal action against a borrower with respect to a “home loan” (as defined in the relevant statutes), a lender must: send written notice to the borrower by certified and regular mail that the loan is in default; provide a list of approved housing agencies that offer free or low-cost counseling; and, advise that legal action may be commenced after ninety days if no action is taken to resolve the matter.

In New York, the equity of redemption is a long standing common law right that allows those with certain interests in real property to redeem mortgaged property and prevent a foreclosure sale by tendering the full amount due at any time before the foreclosure sale.

In prior BLOG articles, we discussed the court’s power to toll the accrual of interest in mortgage foreclosure actions.

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger A basic tenet of contract interpretation is that “agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.” Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc. , 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002) (citations omitted); see also SM Owner, LLC v. Envoy Towers Co., L.P. , 245 A.D.3d 973 (2 nd Dept. 2026). It is equally fundamental that the “best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing.” Greenfield , 98 N.Y.2d at 569 ( quotin

By Jonathan H. Freiberger On March 17, 2026, the Appellate Division, First Department, decided HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Nicholas , a mortgage foreclosure action that addresses many of the issues raised in our prior BLOG articles. HSBC involves the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (“FAPA”), and the statute of limitations in foreclosure actions. By way of brief background, FAPA went into effect in December of 2022, and “represents the Legislature’s response to litigation strat

On January 28, 2026, the Appellate Division, Second Department, decided Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Starr, a mortgage foreclosure action that addresses many of the issues raised in our prior BLOG articles.

Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) and Generative Artificial Intelligence (“GenAI”) are all the rage these days.

This BLOG has previously addressed the issue of a defendant’s appearance in an action – both formal and informal.

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In New York, foreign business entities – e.g. , corporations, limited liability companies, and partnerships authorized to do business in another jurisdiction or country – are required to register to do business with the Secretary of State. The failure to receive such authority deprives the foreign entity of the ability to affirmatively access the courts of New York and subjects any action commenced by the foreign entity to dismissal. The purpose of the r

. By Jonathan H. Freiberger Last Week in our BLOG article: “ Just When You Thought It Could Not Get More Unanimous, The Court of Appeals Determines that FAPA’s Retroactive Application Does Not Violate the Due Process or Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution or the Right to Substantive and Procedural Due Process Under the New York Constitution – Part 1 ,” we discussed FAPA and the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, N. A. , in which the C