On October 31, 2025, the Supreme Court, Kings County, decided loanDepot.com LLC v. Ortner, a case addressing the meaning of the “taking proceedings” requirement of CPLR 3215(c).

In Sire Spirits, LLC v. Beam Suntory, Inc., 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 06297 (1st Dept. Nov. 18, 2025), the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of a motion to amend a complaint seeking damages for “diminution of enterprise value” due to the alleged fraud.

In Tri-Rail, the Court decided a “question which has not been directly addressed” in the Second Department involving the impact of non-compliance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (f/k/a the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act) (the “Act”) on obtaining a default judgment.

Obtaining personal jurisdiction[1] over a defendant is a critical aspect of litigation.

New York’s adoption of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act in 2019 modernized its Debtor and Creditor Law. The revised law allows creditors to void both actual and constructive fraudulent transfers. Constructive fraud focuses on inadequate value and insolvency, while actual fraud hinges on intent, assessed via “badges of fraud.”

In today’s article, we examine Harris v. Dream Volunteers, a case in which the court reaffirmed a fundamental principle of contract interpretation: contracts that are clear and unambiguous must be enforced according to their plain terms.

In 1995 Cam LLC v. West Side Advisors, LLC, the Court of Appeals held that a “good guy” guarantor’s liability under a commercial lease ends when the tenant vacates and surrenders possession, not when the landlord accepts the surrender.

In Kellinger v. Fox Media LLC, the New York Supreme Court granted a motion brought by defendants to enforce a $15,000 settlement agreement with plaintiff. The motion court found that plaintiff had confirmed the settlement by email, satisfying CPLR 2104’s requirement for a written agreement. Although plaintiff later claimed he only agreed to review the documents, the motion court held that his email constituted a binding acceptance of the settlement.

As readers of this Blog know, a “cause of action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentation requires a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.”

Givens addresses three issues encountered in mortgage foreclosure actions:[1] motions for extensions of time pursuant to CPLR 2004, the 90-day requirement to conduct foreclosure sales pursuant to RPAPL 1351(1), and the tolling of interest due to a lender’s delays in prosecuting its foreclosure action.

In Simpson v. Chassen, the New York Supreme Court compelled the production of a joint defense agreement, rejecting claims that it was protected under the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.

Today, we consider Tahari v. 860 Fifth Ave. Corp., 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05584 (1st Dept. Oct. 9, 2025), an apparent case of first impression in the Appellate Division, First Department, involving the suability of a board of directors under New York law.

In today’s Fraud Notes, we examine two cases involving principles familiar to readers of this Blog: the duplication doctrine and the requirement that plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to satisfy each element of a fraud claim.

In Dodobayeva v. Rubinoff, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05219 (2d Dept. Oct. 1, 2025), we explore the legal concept of fraud in the execution. Fraud in the execution, or fraud in the factum, occurs when a person is misled into signing a document without understanding its nature.

In Macklowe Inv. Props. LLC v. MIP 57th Dev. Acquisition LLC, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05192 (1st Dept. Sept. 30, 2025), the plaintiff, a real estate brokerage, sued pursuant to a letter agreement for a leasing commission after securing a tenant for defendants’ property. The letter agreement required satisfaction of a condition precedent before payment of the commission: execution of a leasing commission agreement. Plaintiff never fulfilled this condition.

In CJS Indus. Inc. v. Dolce, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05037 (1st Dept. Sept. 23, 2025, plaintiff sued RS Custom Woodworking and its representatives for fraud after winning an arbitration award. Both the motion court and the Appellate Division, First Department, found that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with the required particularity in compliance with CPLR 3016(b).

In Jefferies LLC v. Blaize Holdings, Inc., 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 33272(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Sept. 3, 2025 (here), the New York Supreme Court held that an engagement letter concerning the provision of investment banking services did not qualify as an “instrument for the payment of money only” under CPLR 3213, which allows for expedited summary judgment.

Today’s article is about Nuruzzaman v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., an action that involves numerous areas of the law about which we frequently write -- mortgage foreclosure, FAPA, RPAPL 1501(4), CPLR 205(a), CPLR 205-A and statutes of limitation.

In Celauro v. Celauro, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 04870 (Sept. 10, 2025), a minority shareholder of a family-owned business alleged that company executives operated an illicit cash business, diverted profits and deprived shareholders of distributions/dividends. The motion court dismissed most of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, finding many of the allegations to be time-barred under the six-year statute of limitations and the surviving claims too speculative.

In New York, as in most jurisdictions, statutes of limitation serve as a cutoff point for initiating legal action. In business litigation, parties often encounter statutes of limitation issues involving, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims.