By: Jonathan H. Freiberger The term “venue” in the context of litigation refers to the location where the trial will take place. In general, and as previously described in prior articles, Venue, which is governed by Article 5 of the CPLR , is initially chosen by the plaintiff at the commencement of the action. Sometimes an improper venue is chosen by the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the defendant can move to change venue to a proper venue. CPLR 510(1) ; see also Kidd v.

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger There are certain categories of individuals and entities that are required to be named as defendants in mortgage foreclosure actions and the failure to name such “necessary defendants” can have serious implications. New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1311 , which sets forth such “necessary defendants,” provides: Each of the following persons, whose interest is claimed to be subject and subordinate to the plaintiff's lien, shall

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article relates to CPLR 321(c) , a topic we have addressed before < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . As previously discussed in this BLOG, once an attorney appears and becomes the attorney of record, the client is free to change counsel by filing with the clerk, a substitution of counsel stipulation, which must also be served on “the attorneys for all parties in the action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the par

By: Jeffrey M. Haber To state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege “a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.” The claim must pleaded with particularity. Conclusory allegations will not suffice. Neither will allegations based on information and

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In Crawford v. Integrated Asset Mgt. Servs., LLC , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 01352 (2d Dept. Mar. 12, 2025) ( here ), the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims, among others, involving a home improvement project in Brooklyn, N.Y., on the grounds of duplication with the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. Crawford is notable because the Court held that the fraud damage

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger The title for today’s article refers to one of the most played songs by DJs at college parties, and VJs on the fledgling MTV Network, in the very early eighties. My hope in writing today’s article is that all readers of this BLOG in their 50s and early 60s are inspired to call the number 867-5309 and leave voice mail messages about RPAPL 1304 , the subject of today’s article. This BLOG has frequently written about mortgage foreclosure actions, in ge

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In Imperium Blue Acquisition Partners, LLC v. Marathon Asset Mgt., L.P. , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 01317 (1st Dept. Mar. 11, 2025) ( here ), the Appellate Division, First Department was asked to consider whether, among other things, plaintiffs satisfied the justifiable reliance element of a fraud claim. As discussed below, the Court held that plaintiffs failed to do so. In Essential Home Remodeling, Inc. v. Rossin , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 01314 (1st Dept. Mar. 11,

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Previously, this Blog examined the doctrine of res judicata ( here , here , here and here ). Under the doctrine, a party may not litigate a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter. The doctrine applies not only to claims actually litigated but also to claims that could have been raised in the prior litigation. The rationale underlying the doctrine is that a party who h

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger “Just Once,” which is an appropriate title for today’s article, is a James Ingram song from Quincy Jones’ “The Dude” album; an album I have listened to many times throughout, and after, college. Today we will discuss U.S. Bank National Assoc. v. Deblinger , a mortgage foreclosure action that resulted in a decision on February 26, 2025, by the Appellate Division, Second Department. In 2017, the lender commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage afte

By: Jeffrey M. Haber It is well-settled that a plaintiff asserting a derivative claim seeks to recover for injury to the business entity, regardless of whether the entity is a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership. A plaintiff asserting a direct claim seeks redress for injury to himself/herself individually. “The distinction between derivative and direct claims is grounded upon the principle that does not have an individual cause of action that derives from

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Seasoned attorneys will get the reference in the title of this article to one of Maxwell Smart’s catch phrases from “Get Smart”, but most of the younger folks might not. [1] In any event, the phrase seems prescient in light of a nuanced FAPA related change to CPLR 205 . As stated in prior BLOG articles, when a applicable statute of limitations expires during the pendency of an action, under certain circumstances, CPLR 205(a) permits the plaintiff t

By: Jeffrey M. Haber The question that clients most often ask their attorney is whether they can get back their attorney’s fees if they prevail on their claims. As we have explained in past articles ( e.g. , here , here , here , and here ), attorney’s fees are not generally recoverable in litigation under the “American Rule”. Under the American Rule, “attorney’s fees are incidents of litigation and a prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is auth

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger It is axiomatic that a “plaintiff appears merely by bringing it.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Hall , 185 A.D.3d 1006, 1007 (2 nd Dep’t 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once served with process, a defendant must appear in an action to avoid a default. CPLR 320(a) , which sets forth, inter alia, the way a defendant can appear in an action, provides that “ he defendant appears by serving an answer or a notice of appearanc

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Now and then a lawyer fails to meet a deadline or otherwise acts untimely. Several “saving” provisions in the Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) are available to assist a lawyer when deadlines are missed. These include: CPLR 2005, CPLR 3012(d), and CPLR 5015(a). The key to applying one or more of these provisions is the reasonableness of the excuse for the delay or default. In Fox v. Gross , 219 A.D.3d 584, 585-586 (2d Dept. 2023), the Appellate Divi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today we revisit CPLR 3215(c) , a provision addressed by this BLOG several times before. See, e.g., < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . As previously discussed in our prior BLOGS, and by way of brief background, CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that: If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judg

By: Jeffrey M. Haber It is not uncommon for courts to apply the law of another jurisdiction to resolve a dispute before it. In commercial matters, choice of law contract provisions and doctrines, such as the internal affairs doctrine, typically identify the law that should apply to the parties’ dispute. Palella v. TMO VI LLC , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 30373(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Jan. 27, 2025) ( here ), is a recent example of a New York court applying the law of another jurisdi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As discussed in prior BLOG articles, potential clients frequently inquire about the ability to recoup legal fees in the event of litigation. Certainly, a litigant’s ability to recoup legal fees and/or be forced to pay an adversary’s legal fees might be a significant factor in deciding whether to commence a lawsuit. Generally, the answer is explained by the “American Rule,” which provides that “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to c

By: Jeffrey M. Haber As readers of this Blog know, to recover damages for fraud, a plaintiff must allege “a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.” The element that most often spells failure for a plaintiff is reasonable reliance – that is, reliance on

By: Jeffrey M. Haber We have written frequently about the substance and scope of general releases. In New York, “a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release.” If “the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a ‘jural act’ binding on the parties.” For this reason, “ release should never be converted into a starting point for … litigation except under circumstances and under rules

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involving mortgage foreclosure, generally, and notices of pendency, specifically. Today’s article involves both issues with a sprinkle of sanctions. By way of background, and as explained in prior articles, a notice of pendency (or lis pendens ) is a provisional remedy available to litigants seeking a judgment that affects title to real property. 5303 Realty Corp. v. O&Y Equity Corp. , 64 N.