By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Seasoned attorneys will get the reference in the title of this article to one of Maxwell Smart’s catch phrases from “Get Smart”, but most of the younger folks might not. [1] In any event, the phrase seems prescient in light of a nuanced FAPA related change to CPLR 205 . As stated in prior BLOG articles, when a applicable statute of limitations expires during the pendency of an action, under certain circumstances, CPLR 205(a) permits the plaintiff t

By: Jeffrey M. Haber The question that clients most often ask their attorney is whether they can get back their attorney’s fees if they prevail on their claims. As we have explained in past articles ( e.g. , here , here , here , and here ), attorney’s fees are not generally recoverable in litigation under the “American Rule”. Under the American Rule, “attorney’s fees are incidents of litigation and a prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is auth

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger It is axiomatic that a “plaintiff appears merely by bringing it.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Hall , 185 A.D.3d 1006, 1007 (2 nd Dep’t 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once served with process, a defendant must appear in an action to avoid a default. CPLR 320(a) , which sets forth, inter alia, the way a defendant can appear in an action, provides that “ he defendant appears by serving an answer or a notice of appearanc

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Now and then a lawyer fails to meet a deadline or otherwise acts untimely. Several “saving” provisions in the Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) are available to assist a lawyer when deadlines are missed. These include: CPLR 2005, CPLR 3012(d), and CPLR 5015(a). The key to applying one or more of these provisions is the reasonableness of the excuse for the delay or default. In Fox v. Gross , 219 A.D.3d 584, 585-586 (2d Dept. 2023), the Appellate Divi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today we revisit CPLR 3215(c) , a provision addressed by this BLOG several times before. See, e.g., < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . As previously discussed in our prior BLOGS, and by way of brief background, CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that: If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judg

By: Jeffrey M. Haber It is not uncommon for courts to apply the law of another jurisdiction to resolve a dispute before it. In commercial matters, choice of law contract provisions and doctrines, such as the internal affairs doctrine, typically identify the law that should apply to the parties’ dispute. Palella v. TMO VI LLC , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 30373(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Jan. 27, 2025) ( here ), is a recent example of a New York court applying the law of another jurisdi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As discussed in prior BLOG articles, potential clients frequently inquire about the ability to recoup legal fees in the event of litigation. Certainly, a litigant’s ability to recoup legal fees and/or be forced to pay an adversary’s legal fees might be a significant factor in deciding whether to commence a lawsuit. Generally, the answer is explained by the “American Rule,” which provides that “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to c

By: Jeffrey M. Haber As readers of this Blog know, to recover damages for fraud, a plaintiff must allege “a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.” The element that most often spells failure for a plaintiff is reasonable reliance – that is, reliance on

By: Jeffrey M. Haber We have written frequently about the substance and scope of general releases. In New York, “a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release.” If “the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a ‘jural act’ binding on the parties.” For this reason, “ release should never be converted into a starting point for … litigation except under circumstances and under rules

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involving mortgage foreclosure, generally, and notices of pendency, specifically. Today’s article involves both issues with a sprinkle of sanctions. By way of background, and as explained in prior articles, a notice of pendency (or lis pendens ) is a provisional remedy available to litigants seeking a judgment that affects title to real property. 5303 Realty Corp. v. O&Y Equity Corp. , 64 N.

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In New York, litigants often grapple with the appropriate limitation period to apply to breach of fiduciary claims. There is no single statute of limitations that the courts and the parties can look to. “Rather, the choice of the applicable limitations period depends on the substantive remedy that the plaintiff seeks.” “Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging ‘injury to property’ within the meaning of CP

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In Katsorhis v. 718 W. Beech St, LLC , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 00211 (1st Dept. Jan. 15, 2025) ( here ), the Appellate Division, Second Department considered a fraud claim that the lower court sustained on the grounds that defendant failed to raise an issue of fact about a fact that was not a fact in dispute. The Court also considered whether the motion court erred in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims alleging violations of General Busi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involving mortgage foreclosure and usury. Today’s article involves both issues. By way of background, and as explained in prior articles, usury statutes were developed to “protect desperately poor people from the consequences of their own desperation.” Seidel v. 18East 17 th Street Owners, Inc. , 79 N.Y.2d 735, 740 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To successfully r

By: Jeffrey M. Haber In Hobish v. AXA Equit. Life Ins. Co. , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 00183 (Jan. 14, 2025) ( here ), the New York Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether punitive damages can be awarded to a successful party under General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349. Answering the question in the negative, the Court, in an opinion written by Judge Shirley Troutman, resolved a split among the appellate divisions. GBL § 349 applies to virtually all economic activity, and i

By: Jeffrey M. Haber On numerous occasions, this Blog has examined the attorney-client privilege, the common interest doctrine, and the attorney work product doctrine. Today, we take another opportunity to explore the contours of these privileges. The Tension Between Disclosure and The Attorney-Client Privilege The Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) directs that there shall be “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involved with mortgage foreclosure. Because of, inter alia , the frequency with which mortgages are bought, sold, assigned and otherwise transferred, one issue that frequently arises in mortgage foreclosure actions is whether the plaintiff has standing to commence its action. Briefly stated, “ tanding involves a determination of whether the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizabl

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Under New York law, written agreements are construed in accordance with the parties’ intent. “The best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing.” As such, “a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.” “Courts may not ‘by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new con

Melville, NY January 3, 2025 – On January 3, 2025, Freiberger Haber LLP partner Jonathan H. Freiberger was interviewed by Pat Kiernan, on NY1’s Mornings on 1 news broadcast. Mr. Kiernan and Jonathan discussed preliminary injunctions, temporary restraining orders, both in general and as they relate to the action pending in the New Jersey Federal District Court commenced by The State of New Jersey in an effort to stop the implementation of New York’s Central Business District T

By: Jeffrey M. Haber The justifiable reliance element has been described as a “fundamental precept” and a “venerable rule”. The requirement is one of the five elements of a fraud cause of action: (1) a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact; (2) which was false and known to be false by the defendant(s); (3) made for the purpose of inducing another person to rely upon it; (4) justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission; an

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Many times, remedies for the breach of a contract other than monetary damages are necessary to make a plaintiff whole. One such remedy is specific performance. The remedy of specific performance “will not be ordered where money damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interests of the injured party.” Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Development Corp. , 96 N.Y.2d 409, 415 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Specific perf