Mortgage Foreclosure

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger The title for today’s article refers to one of the most played songs by DJs at college parties, and VJs on the fledgling MTV Network, in the very early eighties. My hope in writing today’s article is that all readers of this BLOG in their 50s and early 60s are inspired to call the number 867-5309 and leave voice mail messages about RPAPL 1304 , the subject of today’s article. This BLOG has frequently written about mortgage foreclosure actions, in ge

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger “Just Once,” which is an appropriate title for today’s article, is a James Ingram song from Quincy Jones’ “The Dude” album; an album I have listened to many times throughout, and after, college. Today we will discuss U.S. Bank National Assoc. v. Deblinger , a mortgage foreclosure action that resulted in a decision on February 26, 2025, by the Appellate Division, Second Department. In 2017, the lender commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage afte

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Seasoned attorneys will get the reference in the title of this article to one of Maxwell Smart’s catch phrases from “Get Smart”, but most of the younger folks might not. In any event, the phrase seems prescient in light of a nuanced FAPA related change to CPLR 205 . As stated in prior BLOG articles, when an applicable statute of limitations expires during the pendency of an action, under certain circumstances, CPLR 205(a) permits the plaintiff to c

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger It is axiomatic that a “plaintiff appears merely by bringing it.” Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Hall , 185 A.D.3d 1006, 1007 (2 nd Dep’t 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once served with process, a defendant must appear in an action to avoid a default. CPLR 320(a) , which sets forth, inter alia, the way a defendant can appear in an action, provides that “ he defendant appears by serving an answer or a notice of appearanc

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today we revisit CPLR 3215(c) , a provision addressed by this BLOG several times before. See, e.g., < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . As previously discussed in our prior BLOGS, and by way of brief background, CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that: If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judg

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involving mortgage foreclosure, generally, and notices of pendency, specifically. Today’s article involves both issues with a sprinkle of sanctions. By way of background, and as explained in prior articles, a notice of pendency (or lis pendens ) is a provisional remedy available to litigants seeking a judgment that affects title to real property. 5303 Realty Corp. v. O&Y Equity Corp. , 64 N.

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involving mortgage foreclosure and usury. Today’s article involves both issues. By way of background, and as explained in prior articles, usury statutes were developed to “protect desperately poor people from the consequences of their own desperation.” Seidel v. 18East 17 th Street Owners, Inc. , 79 N.Y.2d 735, 740 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To successfully r

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently address issues involved with mortgage foreclosure. Because of, inter alia , the frequency with which mortgages are bought, sold, assigned and otherwise transferred, one issue that frequently arises in mortgage foreclosure actions is whether the plaintiff has standing to commence its action. Briefly stated, “ tanding involves a determination of whether the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizabl

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s BLOG article concerns CPLR 306-b . As previously explained in prior articles, actions or proceedings (collectively, “Actions”) are commenced by filing the initiatory papers with the appropriate county clerk. CPLR 304(a) . Once the Action is commenced, the plaintiff is required to serve the initiatory papers on the defendant, and generally such service must occur within 120 days after the Action is commenced. CPLR 306-b. “If service is not

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently write about issues relating to mortgage foreclosure. We have also written numerous articles relating to the recently enacted FAPA . See, e.g., < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . Today’s BLOG article relates to Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Farkas , and Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Dalal , cases decided by the Appellate Divis

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As discussed in a prior BLOG article , one of the first questions asked by a potential client when consulting about a new litigation matter is “can we recoup our legal fees in the litigation.” In response, we must explain that, according to the “American Rule,” “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorney fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Services Co. v. Wilderness Society , 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (provi

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently write about issues relating to mortgage foreclosure. We have also written numerous articles relating to the recently enacted FAPA. See, e.g., < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . Today’s BLOG article relates to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Edwards , a case decided by the Appellate Division, Second Department, on October 30, 202

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s BLOG article relates to Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Miglucci , a mortgage foreclosure action decided by the Appellate Division, Third Department, on October 17, 2024. The Court in Miglucci determined that the accrual date of a cause of action for the foreclosure of a reverse mortgage generally accrues upon the death of the borrower. In 2008, the Miglucci borrower borrowed money from the lender and secured her repayment obligations

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger As readers of this BLOG know, we frequently write about issues relating to mortgage foreclosure. We have also written numerous articles relating to the recently enacted FAPA. See, e.g., < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> , < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . Today’s BLOG article relates to U.S. Bank National Association v. Lynch , a case decided by the Appellate Division, Third Department, on October 24, 2024, and in which it

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Because litigation can be a long and drawn-out process, it is not uncommon for litigants to die during the pendency of a lawsuit. In today’s BLOG article, we address the problems that may arise when a litigant dies. This BLOG has previously addressed this issue. See, e.g ., < here =">here</a>"> and < here =">here</a>"> . As previously noted in prior BLOG articles, in this context CPLR § 1015 – Substitution Upon Death – is instructive and provides:

By Jonathan H. Freiberger On numerous occasions, this Blog has addressed issues related to RPAPL 1304 . Blog=">Blog" Tile="Tile</a>" Freiberger="Freiberger" Haber="Haber" LLP’s="LLP’s" website.="website."> By way of brief background as discussed in prior articles, RPAPL 1304 requires that at least ninety days before commencing legal action against a borrower with respect to a “home loan” (as defined in the relevant statutes), a lender must: send written notice to the borrower

By Jonathan H. Freiberger In today’s BLOG we discuss AMK Capital Corp. v. Plotch . , a case decided on June 18, 2024, by the Appellate Division, First Department, that involves, inter alia , an interesting service of process issue. The Court in AMK Capital recognized that the appeal it was deciding is “an issue of apparent first impression – whether CPLR 308(2)’s restrictions prohibiting the inclusion of information indicating that a communication ‘is from an attorney or con

By Jonathan H. Freiberger In today’s BLOG we discuss Trento 67, LLC v. One West Bank, N.A. , a case decided on June 12, 2024, by the Appellate Division, Second Department, that involves, inter alia , the statute of limitations/acceleration in mortgage foreclosure actions 1 and Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) 1501(4). 2 The Court in Trento recognized that the appeal it was deciding is “an issue of apparent first impression for an appellate court in this S

By Jonathan H. Freiberger A notice of pendency, also known as lis pendens , is a provisional remedy available to litigants seeking a judgment that affects title to real property. 5303 Realty Corp. v. O&Y Equity Corp. , 64 N.Y.2d 313 (1984). 1 The rules concerning notices of pendency are found in Article 65 of the CPLR. As the name suggests, a notice of pendency puts the world on constructive notice that an action has been commenced that may affect the title to the property

By Jonathan H. Freiberger In situations where the statute of limitations expires during the pendency of an action, under certain circumstances, CPLR 205 (a) 1 permits the plaintiff to commence a new action if the original action is dismissed but was timely commenced. CPLR 205(a) provides: If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the c