All Posts

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber As readers of this Blog know, a “cause of action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentation requires a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.” When addressing the element of justifiable reliance, the “general rule” is th

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Today’s article addresses M & T Bank v. Givens , a case decided on October 15, 2025, by the Appellate Division, Second Department. Givens addresses three issues encountered in mortgage foreclosure actions: motions for extensions of time pursuant to CPLR 2004 , the 90-day requirement to conduct foreclosure sales pursuant to RPAPL 1351(1) and the tolling of interest due to a lender’s delays in prosecuting its foreclosure action. CPLR 2004 CPLR 2004

By: Jeffrey M. Haber On numerous occasions, this Blog has examined the attorney-client privilege, the common interest doctrine, and the attorney work product doctrine. Today, we take another opportunity to explore the contours of these privileges. In Simpson v. Chassen , the New York Supreme Court compelled the production of a joint defense agreement (“JDA”), rejecting claims that it was protected under the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine. The

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber Today, we consider Tahari v. 860 Fifth Ave. Corp. , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05584 (1st Dept. Oct. 9, 2025) ( here ), an apparent case of first impression in the Appellate Division, First Department, involving the suability of a board of directors under New York law.    In New York, “the business of a corporation managed under the direction of its board of directors…” Notwithstanding, a corporation’s board of directors is neither empowered to commence an act

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber In today’s Fraud Notes, we examine two cases involving principles familiar to readers of this Blog: the duplication doctrine and the requirement that plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to satisfy each element of a fraud claim. In Emissions Reduction Corp. v. mCloud Tech. (USA) Inc. , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05457 (1st Dept. Oct. 7, 2025) ( here ),  the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s fraud claim on the grounds of dupl

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber As we have noted in prior articles, New York has a “long and strong public policy favoring arbitration”. Indeed, New York “favors and encourages arbitration as a means of conserving the time and resources of the courts and the contracting parties.” “Therefore, New York courts interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties to submit disputes to arbitration.”   “Nonetheless, ‘ ike contract rights generally, a right to arbitration

By:   Jeffrey M. Haber On September 25, 2025, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced ( here ) that it charged the co-founders of Retail Ecommerce Ventures LLC (“REV”), and REV’s Chief Operating Officer (collectively, “Defendants”), with conducting a series of fraudulent securities offerings, misusing investor funds, and making Ponzi-like payments to investors. According to the SEC’s  complaint , REV’s primary business was purchasing distressed retail compani

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber As readers of this Blog know, we have written about many types of fraud over the years, such as affinity fraud, common law fraud, fraud in the inducement, fraudulent concealment, and securities fraud. Another type of fraud concerns fraud in the execution or fraud in the factum. Three years ago, we examined Paredes v. Vorhand , a case involving this legal principle ( here ). Since that time, we have not examined any cases involving fraud in the executio

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber In Macklowe Inv. Props. LLC v. MIP 57th Dev. Acquisition LLC , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05192 (1st Dept. Sept. 30, 2025) ( here ), the plaintiff, a real estate brokerage, sued pursuant to a letter agreement for a leasing commission after securing a tenant for defendants’ property. The letter agreement required satisfaction of a condition precedent before payment of the commission: execution of a leasing commission agreement. Plaintiff never fulfilled this cond