In general, statutes of limitation govern the time in which a cause of action must be interposed after accrual.

In New York, the doctrine of caveat emptor — “let the buyer beware” — remains an important principle in residential real estate transactions. Unlike many other states that require extensive seller disclosures, New York adheres to a more traditional approach: absent fraud, active concealment, or a special relationship, a seller has no general duty to volunteer information about defective conditions in the property.

Today’s BLOG deals with the “Relation-Back Doctrine” (the “Doctrine”)[1], which, inter alia, “allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended filing to relate back to claims previously asserted against a codefendant for Statute of Limitations purposes where the two defendants are “‘united in interest.’”

CPLR 322(a) permits a defendant in an action affecting title to real property to demand proof that the plaintiff’s counsel was authorized to commence the action.

In prior BLOG articles, we discussed the court’s power to toll the accrual of interest in mortgage foreclosure actions.

By Jonathan H. Freiberger On March 17, 2026, the Appellate Division, First Department, decided HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Nicholas , a mortgage foreclosure action that addresses many of the issues raised in our prior BLOG articles. HSBC involves the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (“FAPA”), and the statute of limitations in foreclosure actions. By way of brief background, FAPA went into effect in December of 2022, and “represents the Legislature’s response to litigation strat

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Liability for aiding and abetting a fraud is distinct from liability for committing the underlying fraud itself. This theory of liability recognizes that a defendant may substantially contribute to fraudulent misconduct without personally making any misrepresentation/omission or directly deceiving the plaintiff. Thus, instead of requiring proof that the defendant was the maker of a false statement or omission, an aiding‑and‑abetting theory turns on wheth

On January 28, 2026, the Appellate Division, Second Department, decided Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Starr, a mortgage foreclosure action that addresses many of the issues raised in our prior BLOG articles.

This BLOG has previously addressed the issue of a defendant’s appearance in an action – both formal and informal.

. By Jonathan H. Freiberger Last Week in our BLOG article: “ Just When You Thought It Could Not Get More Unanimous, The Court of Appeals Determines that FAPA’s Retroactive Application Does Not Violate the Due Process or Contract Clauses of the United States Constitution or the Right to Substantive and Procedural Due Process Under the New York Constitution – Part 1 ,” we discussed FAPA and the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, N. A. , in which the C

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Last Week in our BLOG article: “ It’s Unanimous – The Fourth Department Joins the Other Departments and Confirms the Retroactive Application of FAPA ,” we again discussed FAPA and noted that on November 25, 2025, the New York Court of Appeals decided two cases: Article 13 LLC v. Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank , and Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, N. A. , in which the Court determined that retroactive application of FAPA’s provisions passes constitutional muster und

Today’s article is about MCLP Asset Co. v. Zaveri, an action that involves numerous areas of the law about which we frequently write -- mortgage foreclosure, FAPA, CPLR 205(a), CPLR 205-A and statutes of limitation.

On October 31, 2025, the Supreme Court, Kings County, decided loanDepot.com LLC v. Ortner, a case addressing the meaning of the “taking proceedings” requirement of CPLR 3215(c).

In 1995 Cam LLC v. West Side Advisors, LLC, the Court of Appeals held that a “good guy” guarantor’s liability under a commercial lease ends when the tenant vacates and surrenders possession, not when the landlord accepts the surrender.

As readers of this Blog know, a “cause of action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentation requires a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury.”

Givens addresses three issues encountered in mortgage foreclosure actions:[1] motions for extensions of time pursuant to CPLR 2004, the 90-day requirement to conduct foreclosure sales pursuant to RPAPL 1351(1), and the tolling of interest due to a lender’s delays in prosecuting its foreclosure action.

In Dodobayeva v. Rubinoff, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05219 (2d Dept. Oct. 1, 2025), we explore the legal concept of fraud in the execution. Fraud in the execution, or fraud in the factum, occurs when a person is misled into signing a document without understanding its nature.

Today’s article is about Nuruzzaman v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., an action that involves numerous areas of the law about which we frequently write -- mortgage foreclosure, FAPA, RPAPL 1501(4), CPLR 205(a), CPLR 205-A and statutes of limitation.

Obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a critical aspect of litigation. There are two components of personal jurisdiction.

The Second Department has stated that an “RPAPL 1304 notice is a notice pursuant to the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act (Real Property Law § 265-a), the underlying purpose of which is to afford greater protections to homeowners confronted with foreclosure.”