By:  Jeffrey M. Haber In New York, as in most jurisdictions, statutes of limitation serve as a cutoff point for initiating legal action. These statutes define the time frame within which a plaintiff must file a lawsuit after a cause of action accrues. Once the limitation period expires, the claim is generally barred, regardless of its merits. The purpose of a statute of limitations is twofold. For plaintiffs, it encourages timely action, preserving evidence and ensuring witne

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger Obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a critical aspect of litigation. There are two components of personal jurisdiction, which the New York Court of Appeals has succinctly described as follows: One component involves service of process, which implicates due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard. Typically, a defendant who is otherwise subject to a court's jurisdiction, may seek dismissal based on the claim that s

By: Jeffrey M. Haber Pursuant to CPLR 3213, a plaintiff may commence an action “based upon an instrument for the payment of money only or upon any judgment” by filing a summons and motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint. The statute “provide a speedy and effective means” for resolving “presumptively meritorious” claims. The standard to prevail on a CPLR 3213 motion is the same as that on a CPLR 3212 motion: accelerated judgment will be awarded “if, upon all the pa

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber Ponzi schemes and affinity fraud frequently overlap because both exploit trust and social interactions to operate effectively. A Ponzi scheme relies on a continuous stream of new investors to pay returns to earlier participants, creating the illusion of a profitable enterprise. To maintain the flow of funds, fraudsters often target affinity groups—close-knit communities connected by shared identity, such as religious organizations, cultural associations

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber In BLDG 44 Developers LLC v. Pace Companies N.Y., LLC , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op 32881(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County July 25, 2025) ( here ), BLDG 44 Developers LLC sued Pace Companies New York, LLC for breach of contract, seeking approximately $16 million in consequential damages related to delays in a construction project on E. 44th Street, New York, N.Y. BLDG, the project owner, was a third-party beneficiary to a subcontract between Pace and Noble Construction G

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber In Finkelstein v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op 32882(U) (Sup. Ct., July 30, 2025) ( here ), plaintiff alleged that he was underpaid on his investment in a residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) trust due to the improper exercise of termination rights by the trust’s servicers. Plaintiff claimed they excluded deferred principal and interest balances from the termination price, repackaged the remaining loans, and profited from new trusts. Th

By: Jonathan H. Freiberger This BLOG has written extensively on a wide variety of issues in the area of mortgage foreclosure. While we have not written about RPAPL 1304 in a while, it has been the subject of numerous articles in the past. By way of brief background, and as has been previously discussed, the Second Department has stated that an “RPAPL 1304 notice is a notice pursuant to the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act ( Real Property Law § 265-a ), the underlying purpo

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber On occasion, we examine procedural matters that have an impact on the substantive rights of the parties. In Richardson v. Beal , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 32804(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County July 24, 2025) ( here ), the procedural matter at issue concerned the date on which a filing is deemed to be filed. As discussed below, the date on which a filing is deemed filed might surprise you. Overview In  Richardson v. Beal , plaintiffs sought a default judgment against

By:  Jeffrey M. Haber In Southgate Owners Corp. v. Esposito , 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 32750(U) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County July 24, 2025) ( here ), plaintiff sued defendant, a shareholder in its cooperative building, seeking a declaratory judgment that 80 additional shares had been properly allocated to her unit following a 1996 expansion of her unit into terrace space. Plaintiff claimed that defendant refused to accept the allocation and pay her pro rata share of expenses and sought a