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Contractual Service Provisions Mean What They Say: Court Dismisses Merchant Cash Advance Claim for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Writer: Jeffrey Haber
Jeffrey Haber
3 minutes ago
7 min read

A contractual provision permitting service of process by certified mail can provide a valid alternative to the methods of service authorized by the CPLR. But a plaintiff relying on such a provision must comply with the provision as written and establish that service was actually made in accordance with its terms.


That was the lesson of Lendr.Online, LLC v. Nile Hudson LLC, 2026 NY Slip. Op. 51915(U) (Sup. Ct., Rockland County Nov. 13, 2026), where the motion court dismissed a merchant cash advance action against an individual guarantor for lack of personal jurisdiction after concluding that the plaintiff’s attempted service by certified mail was authorized neither by the CPLR nor by the parties’ agreements. The motion court also found that, even if the contractual service provision applied, the plaintiff’s facially inconsistent proof of mailing failed to establish a prima facie case of proper service.


Lendr.Online, LLC v. Nile Hudson LLC


Plaintiff commenced the action on August 12, 2026, seeking $56,020.89, together with interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. According to the complaint, plaintiff had purchased $95,550 in future receivables from the corporate defendant under an August 27, 2025 Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Future Receipts. Defendant, N.E., executed a Personal Guaranty of Performance. Plaintiff alleged that payments stopped on or about June 25, 2026.


Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8).[1]


Neither defendant was personally served. Instead, plaintiff relied on the contractual documents, which purportedly permitted service of process by certified mail, return receipt requested.


The proof of service filed by the plaintiff presented an unusual chronology. Plaintiff’s affirmation of service was dated August 5, 2026, stated that the papers were mailed on August 11, 2026, and annexed postage labels dated August 12, 2026. August 12, 2026 was also the date on which the action was commenced.


Although the affirmation of service was denominated an affirmation, it did not contain the statement prescribed by CPLR 2106.[2] Instead, it was sworn before a Texas notary whose stamp indicated that the notary’s commission had expired on July 6, 2026. Importantly, plaintiff did not file a signed return receipt, tracking information, or other evidence of delivery.


Certified Mail Alone Did Not Satisfy the CPLR


Regarding service, the motion court examined whether certified mail was independently authorized by statute. The motion court made it clear that it was not: “Service by certified mail alone is not among the methods of personal service upon a natural person authorized by CPLR 308, and plaintiff did not seek an order directing an alternative method of service under CPLR 308 (5).”[3]


The motion court also noted that CPLR 312-a did not provide an alternative basis for service.[4] Although that provision permits service by mail, it depends upon the defendant returning the prescribed acknowledgment of receipt. The motion court found no such acknowledgment in the record.[5] That left plaintiff’s contractual theory as the basis for service of process.


Parties Can Contract for an Alternative Method of Service, But the Contract Controls

Under New York law, “[p]arties may agree in advance to a method of service of process other than those prescribed by statute.”[6] “Because such an agreement displaces the protections of the service statutes, it is enforced according to its terms and is not extended beyond them.”[7] 


That became the central issue in Lendr.Online.


The motion court observed that the only provision in the parties’ contract documents addressing service of process appeared in Section 6 of the Guaranty. There, N.E., as Guarantor, submitted “to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the state or federal courts having jurisdiction over Nassau County, New York, and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.”[8] The parties agreed that mailing by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, of “any process required by any such court” would constitute valid service.[9]


Immediately before that consent, however, the parties “stipulate[d] that the venues referenced in th[e] Agreement [were] convenient.”[10] The motion court therefore read the provisions together and concluded that “[t]he consent to mail service is thus expressly tied to litigation in the designated fora.”[11]


That interpretation was dispositive because plaintiff sued in Rockland County and attempted to rely on the Guaranty’s certified mail provision to effect service. As the motion court explained, Section 6 had to be read as an integrated arrangement governing both the forum in which the Guarantor agreed to litigate and the alternative means by which he agreed to accept service in that forum.[12] In other words, N.E. agreed to accept service by certified mail only if the action was brought in one of the fora specified in the Guaranty, and Rockland County was not one of them.


The motion court recognized a potentially significant counterargument.[13] New York Supreme Court is a single court of statewide general original jurisdiction, and the county in which an action is brought generally concerns venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, as the motion court observed, one could argue that Supreme Court sitting in Rockland County remained a state court “having jurisdiction over Nassau County.”[14] 


The motion court rejected that reading based on the language of the Guaranty as a whole. Section 6 did not simply select a court with jurisdiction, it provided for “exclusive jurisdiction and venue” in the designated fora.[15] “Read as a whole, section 6 is a single arrangement under which the Guarantor agreed to litigate in Nassau County or in the designated federal court, stipulated that those venues are convenient, and, in that setting, accepted service by certified mail.”[16] “A plaintiff that sues outside the forum the provision designates,” concluded the motion court, “cannot enforce the provision’s service component while disregarding its venue component.”[17] The motion court observed that such a conclusion followed from the broader principle that a contractual waiver of statutory service protections is enforceable only in accordance with its terms.[18] Thus, because plaintiff elected to sue in Rockland County, it could not invoke the certified mail provision tied to litigation in the contractually designated fora.


Accordingly, the motion court held that “[p]laintiff’s attempted service upon [N.E.] by certified mail was not authorized by statute or by agreement, and it [was] a nullity.”[19]


The Proof of Mailing Was Defective in Any Event


Even assuming Section 6 of the Guaranty applied, the motion court concluded that plaintiff’s proof did not establish service under that provision.[20] As the motion court observed, “[t]he sole proof of the mailing is a document that is internally inconsistent on its face.”[21] The purported affirmation was dated August 5, 2026, but described a mailing on August 11, 2026, one day before the action was commenced under CPLR 304(a), while the annexed postage labels bore the date August 12, 2026. Moreover, although styled an affirmation, the document did not contain the statement prescribed by CPLR 2106 and was instead sworn before a notary whose stamp reflected that the notary’s commission had expired on July 6, 2026. Compounding those deficiencies, “[n]o return receipt, tracking record, or other evidence that the papers were mailed as described” was submitted.[22] As a result, the motion court held that plaintiff “failed to establish that personal jurisdiction was obtained over [N.E.],” and dismissed the complaint “as against him.”[23]


Takeaway


Lendr.Online is a useful reminder that a contractual service provision is not a blanket license to serve process by whatever method the clause happens to mention.


Parties may contract around the CPLR’s ordinary service requirements, but, as the motion court put it, an agreement doing so “is enforced according to its terms and is not extended beyond them.” In Lendr.Online, the guarantor’s acceptance of certified mail service was part of a broader provision specifying where litigation would occur. Plaintiff could not invoke one part of that contractual arrangement while disregarding the other.


The decision also illustrates a second, more practical point. Even when contractual service by mail is available, the plaintiff still must prove that it properly made the mailing. Facial inconsistencies among the date of an affirmation, the purported mailing date, the commencement date, and the postage records, coupled with a defective jurat and the absence of a return receipt or tracking information, left plaintiff unable to make even a prima facie showing of service.


Lendr.Online therefore illustrates the risk of treating contractual service language as boilerplate. The forum provision, the method of service, and the proof of service are not independent procedural details. When the contract connects them, they operate together, and a failure at any step can prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant. In the end, the lesson of Lendr.Online is as simple as it is consequential: contractual service provisions mean what they say, and failure to follow them can mean no jurisdiction at all.

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Jeffrey M. Haber is a partner and co-founder of Freiberger Haber LLP.


This article is for informational purposes only and is not intended to be, and should not be, taken as legal advice.


Unless otherwise stated, Freiberger Haber LLP’s articles are based on recently decided published opinions or litigation releases and not on matters handled by the firm.

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[1] On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained through proper service of process. A properly executed affidavit of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service, and where the defendant submits a sworn, detailed denial that rebuts that showing, a hearing is ordinarily required (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Tauber, 140 A.D.3d 1154, 1155 (2d Dept. 2016); FV-1, Inc. v. Reid, 138 A.D.3d 922, 923 (2d Dept. 2016). No hearing is required, however, where the method of service employed was not authorized by statute or by the parties’ agreement, because service by an unauthorized method is a nullity, or where the plaintiff’s own submissions fail to make a prima facie showing of proper service.


[2] The statement required by CPLR 2106 is as follows: “I affirm this ___ day of ______, ____, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, except as to matters alleged on information and belief and as to those matters I believe it to be true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.”


[3] Slip Op. at *3.


[4] Id.


[5] Id.


[6] Id., citing Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 355 (1931); National Equipment Rental, Ltd. V. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-316 (1964); see also Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.a.r.l., 78 A.D.3d 137, 141 (1st Dept. 2010) (guaranty’s provision directing the manner of notice authorized service of process upon guarantor by email).


[7] Id., citing Wynwood Capital Group LLC v. Confluence Corp., 82 Misc. 3d 1247(A), 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 50557(U) (Sup. Ct., Kings County 2024) (plaintiff bears burden of proving service under contractual provision, which must be effectuated strictly in accordance therewith).


[8] Id. at *4.


[9] Id.


[10] Id.


[11] Id.


[12] Id.


[13] Id.


[14] Id.


[15] Id. (orig’l emphasis).


[16] Id.


[17] Id.


[18] Id.


[19] Id.


[20] Id.


[21] Id.


[22] Id. at 4-5.


[23] Id. at *5.

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