When Is a Performance Fee Earned? First Department Enforces Quarter-End Requirement

By: Jeffrey M. Haber
When an investment is realized at a profit, has the investment manager earned its performance fee? Not always. In Invictus Global Mgt., LLC v. Corbin Capital Partners, L.P., 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. In 06572 (1st Dept. Nov. 12, 2026), the Appellate Division, First Department, considered the question of whether the investment was realized before the governing agreements were terminated, but the contractual quarter-end date for calculating and paying the performance fee had not yet occurred.
As discussed, the timing was critical. The investment was realized in January 2023, and plaintiff claimed a Performance Fee of approximately $1.5 million. Defendant terminated the governing co-investment agreements the following month, before the March 31 quarter-end. The Agreements provided that Performance Fees would be “calculated and paid” as of each calendar quarter-end. Plaintiff maintained that its entitlement arose upon realization of the investment, with quarter-end serving as the time for calculating and paying the fee. Defendant maintained that no entitlement accrued or vested until quarter-end itself.
The First Department agreed with defendant, holding that the Performance Fee was not “earned” until calendar quarter-end and therefore had not accrued when the Agreements were terminated.
The Parties’ Agreements and the Performance Fee
The dispute arose from a co-investment relationship involving plaintiffs Invictus Global Management, LLC (“IGM”) and Invictus Special Situations I GP, LLC (“ISS”), and defendants Corbin Capital Partners, L.P. (“Corbin”), CEOF Holdings LP (“CEOF”), and Corbin Opportunity Fund, L.P. (“COF”).[1] IGM is an investment management firm whose founders had more than forty years of experience in distressed investing, complex restructuring, and litigation. ISS managed certain investments for Corbin through IGM.
The parties began working together in July 2019 under separate sub-advisory agreements for COF and CEOF. In December 2021, they replaced those agreements with amended and restated co-investment agreements (the “Agreements”). The Agreements were substantially identical in the provisions relevant to the dispute.
Among other things, the Agreements provided for a Performance Fee on qualifying investments. The fee was calculated under a contractual formula (“Performance Fee Formula”). The Agreements provided that the Performance Fee for each investment would be calculated and paid independently of other Company Investments “as of each calendar quarter-end.”
The Agreements also permitted Corbin to terminate upon ten days’ written notice. Importantly, the Agreement expressly identified several provisions that would survive termination, but the provisions governing compensation were not among them.
The Law Firm Investment and Termination
The dispute centered on an investment involving a portfolio of legal claims associated with a law firm (the “Law Firm Investment”), which was listed as a CEOF investment under the 2021 Agreements. Plaintiffs conducted due diligence on the opportunity and, after the investment closed in early 2020, managed it for approximately three years. Under the arrangement applicable to the Law Firm Investment, Invictus did not receive a management fee and instead was eligible for a 25% Performance Fee.
The Law Firm Investment was realized on January 6, 2023, when the funding was repaid. The investment resulted in approximately $6 million in cash profit on an investment of approximately $8 million. Plaintiffs took the position that there were no “prior Company Investments” whose losses had to be offset under the Performance Fee Formula and that application of the Performance Fee rate resulted in a fee of approximately $1.5 million. On January 17, 2023, Plaintiffs invoiced defendant for that amount.
Defendant did not pay the invoice. On February 28, 2023, before the end of the calendar quarter, defendant terminated the Agreements.
The parties disagreed over the effect of the termination. Invictus maintained that its right to the Performance Fee arose when the Law Firm Investment was realized, with quarter-end establishing the time for calculating and paying the fee. Corbin contended that no Performance Fee was earned, accrued, or vested before the quarter-end calculation. Because the Agreements were terminated before March 31, Corbin maintained that the right to the fee never arose.
Plaintiffs commenced the action in 2023. As relevant to the appeal, plaintiffs alleged that defendant breached the Agreements by failing to pay the Performance Fee associated with the Law Firm Investment.
Following discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, while plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment on liability for their breach of contract claim.
The motion court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.
The motion court concluded that the Performance Fee had not accrued or been earned when the Agreements were terminated. It read the compensation provisions as requiring the quarter-end calculation to occur before the fee was earned and also relied on the fact that the Agreements expressly identified provisions that survived termination, without including the compensation provisions.
Invictus appealed. The First Department affirmed.
The First Department’s Decision
The Court held that “[t]he breach of contract claim was properly dismissed.”[2] The Court explained that the Performance Fee was not “earned,” and therefore “did not accrue/vest” until “calendar quarter-end,” which occurred after defendants terminated the Agreements.[3] “This is the date on which the agreements state[d] that the Performance Fee 'shall be calculated and paid,'” said the Court.[4] The Court found that there was “[n]othing in the agreements [to] suggest[] that plaintiffs’ entitlement to such fees accrued earlier.”[5] The Court therefore concluded that “[c]alculation [was] not purely an administrative exercise performed after the right to receive fees has already vested, as it entail[ed] deductions for losses, which may [have] continue[d] to be incurred until quarter-end.”[6]
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contention “that the termination did not cut off their right to receive Performance Fees that were already earned” as being “at odds with the terms of the agreements.”[7] The Court explained that “defendants validly terminated the agreements in compliance with their termination provisions,” and that those provisions “specifically identif[ied] the provisions that survive[d] termination, [and did] not include the provisions regarding compensation.”[8]
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that this interpretation rendered defendants’ promise to pay Performance Fees illusory.[9] The Court reasoned that the defendant’s termination right was subject to at least some limitations, including the requirement of ten days’ written notice, and emphasized that the plaintiffs were sophisticated parties who had bargained for the contractual terms at issue.[10]
Takeaway
Invictus illustrates that earning compensation, calculating its amount, and paying it can be distinct contractual events. When a contractual relationship ends between those events, the distinction can determine whether compensation ever becomes due.
Plaintiffs’ position drew on a plausible distinction among those concepts. The Law Firm Investment had been realized at a profit before the Agreements were terminated. Plaintiffs therefore maintained that the economic event giving rise to its Performance Fee had occurred and that quarter-end established when the fee would be calculated and paid, not when the underlying right to compensation arose. Viewed in that context, the requirement that the Performance Fee be “calculated and paid” at quarter-end did not foreclose that interpretation. A calculation or payment date does not establish the date on which the underlying right to compensation accrues.
But the First Department did not read “calculated and paid” in isolation. It read that language together with the Performance Fee Formula and the other provisions of the Agreements. Because losses could continue to arise through quarter-end and affect the Performance Fee, the quarter-end calculation was not merely a mechanical calculation of a fee already earned. It remained part of determining whether, and to what extent, a Performance Fee had been earned. The Court therefore concluded that the fee did not accrue or vest until quarter-end.
That reading also shows why the Agreements had to be considered as a whole. The timing provision identified when the Performance Fee would be calculated and paid; the Performance Fee Formula determined what had to occur before a Performance Fee could be determined; and the termination provisions addressed what contractual rights survived once the relationship ended. Read together, those provisions supported the Court’s conclusion that realization of the Law Firm Investment did not, by itself, give Invictus a vested right to the Performance Fee.
The termination provisions reinforced the result. The Agreements identified provisions that would survive termination but did not include the provisions governing compensation. The sequence of the Court’s reasoning, however, is important. The survival analysis mattered because the Court had first determined that the Performance Fee had not already vested. Had the fee been earned when the Law Firm Investment was realized, whether termination could extinguish an existing payment obligation would have presented a different contractual question. The accrual determination thus did much of the analytical work.
Interestingly, plaintiffs’ illusory promise argument highlighted a practical consequence of the Court’s interpretation. If the Performance Fee was not earned until quarter-end, Corbin could terminate the Agreements after an investment had been realized at a profit but before the fee vested. Invictus argued that this meant Corbin could receive the benefit of a successful investment and still terminate before becoming obligated to pay the associated Performance Fee, effectively making the promise to pay the fee illusory. The Court rejected that argument. It concluded that Corbin’s termination right was not unlimited because the Agreements required ten days’ written notice, and it emphasized that the parties were sophisticated entities that had bargained for those terms.
Invictus is, therefore, best understood as a contract interpretation decision tied to the interaction among the Performance Fee Formula, the quarter-end provision, the termination right, and the provisions designated to survive termination.
Viewed in that light, Invictus returns to the question with which we started: realizing an investment at a profit does not necessarily mean the investment manager has earned its Performance Fee. The economic event producing the profit, the contractual event causing the right to compensation to vest, and the date on which the compensation is calculated or paid may be different events. In Invictus, the relationship among those events, together with the Agreements’ termination and survival provisions, determined the result.
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Jeffrey M. Haber is a partner and co-founder of Freiberger Haber LLP.
This article is for informational purposes only and is not intended to be, and should not be, taken as legal advice.
Unless otherwise stated, Freiberger Haber LLP’s articles are based on recently decided published opinions or litigation releases and not on matters handled by the firm.
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[1] The background facts come from the briefing on appeal and the First Department’s decision and order.
[2] Slip Op. at *1.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id., citing Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 609, 617-618 (2008); Matter of Dean Witter Reynolds v. Ross, 75 A.D.2d 373, 381 (1st Dept. 1980).
[7] Id.
[8] Id., citing Mulacek v. ExxonMobil Corp., 249 A.D.3d 419, 421 (1st Dept. 2026).
[9] Id.
[10] Id. (citations omitted).


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