“Initiating Proceedings” Under CPLR 3215(c) Revisited Again
Today, we revisit CPLR 3215(c) again. As previously discussed in our prior BLOGS, and by way of brief background, CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:
If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed…. [Emphasis added.]
Courts have held that the language of CPLR 3215(c) is mandatory in the first instance unless plaintiff demonstrates “sufficient cause” for the failure to timely “take proceedings for the entry of [a default] judgment]”. See, e.g., US Bank v. Onuoha, 162 A.D.3d 1094, 1095 (2d Dept. 2018); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Foster, 2026 WL 2727817 at 1 (2d Dept. September 16, 2026); Doe v. Garfinkel, 234 A.D.3d 929, 930-31 (2d Dept. 2025); Wells Fargo Bank v. Cafasso, 158 A.D.3d 848, 849 (2d Dept. 2018). The Cafasso Court (quoting Giglio v. NTIMP, Inc., 86 A.D.3d 301 2d Dept. 2011)), noted that “sufficient cause” “‘requir[es] both a reasonable excuse for the delay in timely moving for a default judgment, plus a demonstration that the cause of action is potentially meritorious.’” Cafasso, 158 A.D.3d at 849; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Robinson-John, 220 A.D.3d 974, 977 (2d Dept. 2023). The “reasonableness” of an excuse is within the sound discretion of the motion court. See, e.g., Onuoha, 162 A.D.3d at 1095-96 (citations omitted); Foster, 2026 WL 2727817 at 1; Cafasso, 158 A.D.3d at 849 (citations omitted). The Doe Court noted that although “a court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse, such excuse must be supported by detailed allegations of fact explaining the law office failure.” Doe, 234 A.D.3d at 931 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, a default judgment need not be obtained within one year, as long as proceedings to obtain a default judgment have been initiated. See, e.g., Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Reynoso, 232 A.D.3d 642, 643-44 (2d Dept. 2024); Bank of America v. Lucido, 163 A.D.3d 614, 615 (2d Dept. 2018); see also Bank of America, N.A. v. Bhola, 219 A.D.3d 430, 432 (2d Dept. 2023); Mort. Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. McVicar, 203 A.D.3d 915, 916-17 (2d Dept. 2022). The Court in Citibank, N.A. v. Kerszko, 203 A.D.3d 42 (2d Dept. 2022), addressed, for the first time, whether a rejected proposed order to show cause for an order of reference “qualifies as a taking of proceedings for the entry of judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), so as to avoid dismissal of the complaint as abandoned under the statute.” Kerszko, 203 A.D.3d at 43-44. In finding that it did, the Kerszko Court held that the relevant inquiry in determining whether “proceedings have been taken” should be focused on the intent of the plaintiff. Thus, the Court, unmoved by the trial court’s failure to sign a proposed order to show cause, stated:
The relevant inquiry, therefore, is not the form that an application takes when presented to the court or its result. Rather, it is the intent that can be inferred from an application presented to the court seeking to have the action “proceed,” inconsistent with that of an abandonment of the plaintiff's claims.
Kerszko, 203 A.D.3d at 52.
In Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Wint, 235 A.D.3d 701 (2d Dept. 2025), the Court reversed the motion court’s sua sponte dismissal of the action finding that the lender timely “initiated proceedings” to take a default. In so doing, the Court stated that the “fact that the Supreme Court rejected the motion as defective is beside the point, as the mere presentment of it established the [lender]'s intent to proceed toward the entry of judgment and not to abandon the action.” Id. at 703 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In US Bank N.A. v. Jerriho-Cadogan, 224 A.D.3d 788 (2d Dept. 2024), the Court found that filing an RJI for a foreclosure settlement conference as mandated by CPLR 3408 constituted “taking proceedings” for the purposes of CPLR 3215(c) because “a settlement conference is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment (see CPLR 3408[a], [m]), [and, therefore,] a formal judicial request for such a conference in connection with an ongoing demand for the ultimate relief sought in the complaint constitutes ‘proceedings for entry of judgment’ within the meaning of CPLR 3215(c).” Id. at 790 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Citimortgage, Inc v. Zaibak, 188 A.D.3d 982 (2d Dept. 2020) (same).
Against this backdrop, we discuss U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Nektalov, a mortgage foreclosure action decided by the Second Department on October 21, 2026. There, the lender commenced its action in April of 2013. The borrower failed to appear or answer. In July 2013, the lender filed an RJI seeking a foreclosure settlement conference. The matter was released from the settlement conference part in September 2013. In June of 2014, the lender moved, inter alia, for a default judgment against the borrower and for an order of reference. The motion was denied in September 2014. In 2022, the borrower moved for an order dismissing the complaint as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), which motion was granted by the motion court.
The Second Department reversed and, in so doing, stated:
To avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), it is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a judgment within one year after the default, nor is a plaintiff required to specifically seek the entry of a judgment within a year. Rather, as long as proceedings are being taken, and these proceedings manifest an intent not to abandon the case but to seek a judgment, the case should not be subject to dismissal. Further, where an action is subject to a mandatory settlement conference (see CPLR 3408), the one-year deadline imposed by CPLR 3215(c) is tolled while settlement conferences are pending.
Here, the [lender] initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment against the [borrower] by moving, inter alia, for an order of reference in June 2014, which was well within one year after the matter was released from the foreclosure settlement conference part. That the motion was denied was irrelevant for purposes of satisfying CPLR 3215(c). It is enough that the plaintiff timely takes the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference to establish that it initiated proceedings for entry of a judgment within one year of the default for the purposes of satisfying CPLR 3215(c). [Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
Jonathan H. Freiberger is a partner and co-founder of Freiberger Haber LLP.
This article is for informational purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.
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