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Ramires v. AGDG Car Wash Corp.: The Court of Appeals Clarifies CPLR 3221 Offers to Compromise

Writer: Jeffrey Haber
Jeffrey Haber
2 minutes ago
13 min read

Settlement offers ordinarily present litigants with a choice: accept the proposed resolution or reject it and continue litigating. CPLR 3221 adds another dimension to that decision. New York’s “offer to compromise” procedure permits a party against whom a claim is asserted to make a formal offer allowing judgment to be entered on specified terms. If the claimant rejects the offer and ultimately fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the statute imposes consequences with respect to the costs incurred after the offer.


The provision is designed to encourage settlement before trial by requiring a claimant to assess not simply whether an offer is acceptable, but whether continuing the litigation is likely to produce a better result. In that respect, CPLR 3221 bears a close resemblance to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which likewise uses the prospect of post-offer cost consequences to encourage settlement. The similarity between the two provisions, however, has limits. Although they employ comparable mechanisms and serve similar purposes, differences in their language and history can produce materially different results.


Those differences recently came to the forefront in Ramires v. AGDG Car Wash Corp., 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06857 (Nov. 19, 2026). There, the Court of Appeals considered whether an offer made under CPLR 3221 that included “costs accrued” but said nothing about attorney’s fees also encompassed attorney’s fees independently recoverable under New York’s Labor Law. The issue required the Court not only to interpret what “costs” means under CPLR 3221, but also to address the federal approach under Rule 68 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).


The result provides an important illustration of why CPLR 3221 and Rule 68, despite their similarities, cannot be read interchangeably. A closer examination of the two provisions, and of the different treatment of attorney’s fees under each, explains both the significance of Ramires and the considerations practitioners should bear in mind when making, accepting, or evaluating a formal offer of judgment.


Ramires v. AGDG Car Wash Corp.


In Ramires, the Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether attorney’s fees were included in defendants’ settlement offer under CPLR 3221 in which the offer did not mention fees and where fee awards are authorized under New York’s Labor Law. The Court held that attorney’s fees were not subsumed in defendants’ offer to compromise. Plaintiffs’ acceptance of the offer therefore did not preclude them from subsequently seeking attorney’s fees. Consequently, the Court reversed the order of the Appellate Division, Second Department.


Plaintiffs commenced the action as a class action seeking damages for defendants’ alleged violations of New York’s wage and hour laws, including improper retention of tips and failure to pay minimum wages and overtime compensation. After the class was certified and the parties engaged in substantial discovery, defendants invoked CPLR 3221 by serving plaintiffs with a written settlement offer “to allow judgment to be taken against them . . . for the sum of $150,000, including costs accrued to the date of th[e] offer.” If plaintiffs declined the offer and failed to obtain a more favorable judgment at trial, CPLR 3221 exposed them to defendants’ “costs” incurred after the offer was made. Plaintiffs accepted the offer, and judgment was entered accordingly. They thereafter moved, as the prevailing parties in a wage and hour action, to recover their attorney’s fees under Labor Law §§ 198 (1-a)-(1-b), (1-d), and 663 (1). Following a hearing, Supreme Court awarded plaintiffs $205,800 in attorney’s fees, and judgment was entered in that amount.


Defendants appealed from the later judgment and filed an undertaking staying its enforcement pending determination of the appeal.[1] Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the judgment was appealable. The Appellate Division, Second Department, denied the motion.


The Second Department subsequently reversed Supreme Court’s judgment awarding fees. It explained that “[u]nder the general rule, attorneys’ fees and disbursements are incidents of litigation and the prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule.”[2] From this the court concluded that, “[w]hen there [i]s no express reservation of rights with respect to the derivative issue of attorneys’ fees, it must be deemed to have been waived and subsumed in the negotiated settlement.”[3] As a result, the court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees because they “agreed to a settlement by offer of compromise without expressly reserving their rights to an award of attorneys’ fees.”[4]


The Second Department granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether its order was properly made. The Court of Appeals answered that question in the negative.


The Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to seek attorney’s fees after accepting defendants’ offer under CPLR 3221. The Court said that “[b]oth the text and history of CPLR 3221 support [its] conclusion.”[5]


CPLR 3221, entitled “Offer to compromise,” is a device “intended to facilitate the resolution of disputes via . . . settlement in lieu of a trial.”[6] It provides that “at any time not later than ten days before trial, any party against whom a claim is asserted, and against whom a separate judgment may be taken, may serve upon the claimant a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against [them] for a sum or property or to the effect therein specified, with costs then accrued.” “If the offer is not accepted and the claimant fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, [they] shall not recover costs from the time of the offer, but shall pay costs from that time.”[7] 


To determine whether the Legislature intended a CPLR 3221 settlement offer to encompass attorney’s fees, the Court looked first to the statute’s text, explaining that “our starting point is the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof.”[8] “[W]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used,” noted the Court.[9] Looking at the “[t]he plain language of CPLR 3221,” the Court found that although it mentions “‘costs,’” it did “not mention ‘attorney's fees.’”[10] The Court concluded that the “absence of this phrase ‘[was] meaningful and intentional as we have previously observed that the failure of the legislature to include a term in a statute is a significant indication that its exclusion was intended.’”[11] 


The Court found that the legislative history reinforced its reading of CPLR 3221.[12] As the Court explained, the rule’s drafters initially proposed using the potential recovery of attorney’s fees as an added incentive for plaintiffs to accept an offer to compromise. Under the original proposal, a plaintiff who rejected an offer and failed to obtain a more favorable judgment would be required to “pay costs, plus reasonable attorney’s fees fixed by the court, for defending the action from that time.”[13] The Court noted, however, that the reference to attorney’s fees did not survive the drafting process. Instead, it was intentionally removed from the rule.[14] Significantly, the drafters explained the effect of that change: “Attorneys’ fees are not a part of these costs so that the rule provides far less inducement to offer a compromise than it did in the 1960 draft.”[15] The Court therefore concluded that both the drafting history and the drafters’ own commentary confirmed its reading of the rule’s text – attorney’s fees are not included within the “costs” contemplated by CPLR 3221.[16]


In so holding, the Court rejected “plaintiffs’ contention that [the Court] should adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to offers of compromise under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as set forth in Marek v. Chesny.”[17] Rule 68 “provides that if a timely pretrial offer of settlement is not accepted and ‘the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.’”[18] In Marek, the Supreme Court held that “the term ‘costs’ in Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority.”[19] This meant, said the Court of Appeals, “that attorney’s fees were only subsumed in the Rule 68 offer when “‘the underlying statute defines “costs” to include attorney’s fees.’”[20] 


In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained that the Supreme Court in Marek looked to the historical understanding of “costs”. As the Supreme Court observed, “[b]y the time the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, federal statutes had authorized and defined awards of costs to prevailing parties for more than 85 years.”[21] The Supreme Court further noted, however, that “[u]nlike in England, such ‘costs’ generally had not included attorney’s fees; under the ‘American Rule,’ each party had been required to bear its own attorney’s fees.”[22]


The Supreme Court recognized that, by the late 1930s, Congress had created exceptions to the American Rule through statutes directing “courts to award attorney’s fees as part of costs in particular cases.”[23] Against that historical backdrop, the Court of Appeals found it significant that “the drafters of Rule 68 did not define the term [costs]; nor [was] there any explanation whatever as to its intended meaning in the history of the Rule.”[24] From that silence, the Marek court reasoned that, “[g]iven the importance of ‘costs’ to the Rule, it is very unlikely that this omission was mere oversight; on the contrary, the most reasonable inference is that the term ‘costs’ in Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority.”[25]


The Court of Appeals explained that Marek did not dictate the same result under CPLR 3221 because, unlike Rule 68, CPLR 3221 has a clear legislative history. As the Court put it, “Thankfully, this Court benefits from the clear legislative history of CPLR 3221, and that history does not support such an interpretation.”[26] Instead, the Court concluded, the legislative history “demonstrates that, regardless of the underlying statute, ‘costs’ within the context of the rule do not include attorney’s fees.”[27]


Having resolved the meaning of “costs” under CPLR 3221, the Court found that the cases relied upon by defendants did not compel a different conclusion. Those cases, the Court explained, principally involved negotiated settlements rather than statutory offers to compromise under CPLR 3221.[28] The distinction mattered because, as the Court observed, CPLR 3221 provides “a statutory mechanism for obtaining a settlement without negotiation.”[29] Defendants’ offer tracked the language of CPLR 3221, and the terms of that offer were therefore dictated by the rule itself. Accordingly, the Court held that “attorney’s fees are not presumptively subsumed within the term ‘costs’ in an offer to compromise made and accepted pursuant to CPLR 3221.”[30]


The Court’s holding resolved what “costs” meant under CPLR 3221, but it did not resolve whether plaintiffs had an independent statutory right to recover attorney’s fees. On that question, the Court concluded that they did. As the Court explained, attorney’s fees remained recoverable where there was “statutory authority providing for such” fees.[31] The Labor Law provided that authority, permitting employees who prevail in wage and hour actions to recover “reasonable attorney’s fees” from their employers.[32] Thus, because neither defendants’ offer nor CPLR 3221 foreclosed attorney’s fees, the Court held that the Second Department erred in concluding that plaintiffs surrendered their entitlement to those fees by accepting the CPLR 3221 offer.[33]


Takeaway


A formal offer to compromise under CPLR 3221 is more than a settlement proposal. It is a device that can alter the economic consequences of continuing the litigation. By making an offer under the rule, a party places the other to a choice: accept judgment on specified terms or proceed with the litigation knowing that, if the ultimate recovery is less favorable, CPLR 3221 may shift the post-offer costs of that decision. The offer thus establishes a statutory benchmark against which the party’s eventual recovery will be measured.


That structure bears an obvious resemblance to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. Both provisions use the prospect of cost-shifting to encourage settlement. But Ramires is important precisely because the Court of Appeals refused to treat that structural similarity as interpretive equivalence. In doing so, the Court clarified not merely whether the particular plaintiffs before it could recover attorney’s fees, but how CPLR 3221 is to be understood and applied going forward.


At the center of the decision is a distinction between procedural “costs” and an independently created substantive right to attorney’s fees. CPLR 3221 speaks in terms of “costs.” It does not mention attorney’s fees. The Labor Law at issue in Ramires, by contrast, expressly authorizes prevailing employees to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. Ramires makes clear that those two concepts should not be collapsed merely because an offer of judgment resolves the underlying claim. Unless CPLR 3221 or the offer itself provides otherwise, acceptance of a statutory offer does not transform an independently authorized attorney’s fee claim into one of the “costs” included within the judgment.


The legislative history of CPLR 3221 gave the Court a strong basis for drawing that line. The omission of attorney’s fees from CPLR 3221 was not simply a statutory silence from which legislative intent had to be inferred. An earlier draft of the rule expressly included “reasonable attorney’s fees fixed by the court” among the consequences imposed upon a claimant who rejected an offer and later failed to obtain a more favorable judgment. That language was removed, and the drafters expressly stated that attorney’s fees were not part of the “costs” contemplated by the rule. The significance of that history extends beyond the immediate dispute. When construing CPLR 3221, courts are not free to enlarge the statutory term “costs” to include a category that the drafting history shows was affirmatively considered and excluded.


That point also explains why Marek v. Chesny, although analogous, could not supply the governing rule. In Marek, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted Rule 68 against a different interpretive background. Rule 68 did not define “costs,” and its history provided no explanation of what the drafters intended the term to encompass. The Supreme Court therefore inferred that Rule 68 incorporated the definition of costs supplied by the substantive statute governing the plaintiff’s claim. Under that framework, when the underlying statute defines attorney’s fees as part of costs, those fees can fall within the operation of Rule 68.


CPLR 3221 presents almost the inverse situation. New York has legislative history that directly addresses the relationship between costs and attorney’s fees. And that history supplies an answer different from the inference drawn in Marek: “regardless of the underlying statute, ‘costs’ within the context of the rule do not include attorney’s fees.” The importance of Ramires, therefore, is not simply that the Court of Appeals declined to follow Marek. It is that the Court identified a distinctly New York meaning of “costs” for purposes of CPLR 3221, grounded in the text and history of the New York rule itself.


There is a broader methodological point in the decision as well. Procedural provisions that resemble their federal counterparts are often interpreted with reference to federal precedent. Ramires illustrates the limits of that approach. Functional similarity may make federal decisions informative, but it does not make them controlling interpretive templates where the New York provision has materially different text or legislative history. Here, the difference was decisive. Rule 68’s silence permitted the inference drawn in Marek; CPLR 3221’s documented history foreclosed it.


The decision is equally significant with respect to the settlement of litigation. The Second Department had effectively treated acceptance of the $150,000 offer as resolving not only the underlying wage claims but also the plaintiffs’ statutory claim for attorney’s fees because they had not expressly reserved those fees. The Court of Appeals rejected that premise. A CPLR 3221 offer is not simply a conventional settlement agreement whose scope is determined entirely by ordinary principles of negotiated contract interpretation. It is “a statutory mechanism for obtaining a settlement without negotiation,” and when the offer tracks the statute, the statutory meaning of its terms matters. Thus, a court cannot presume that acceptance of an offer for a specified sum “including costs accrued” also relinquishes an independently authorized claim for attorney’s fees when neither the statute nor the offer says so.


The significance of Ramires extends beyond the particular offer before the Court. The decision clarifies that “costs” under CPLR 3221 and attorney’s fees recoverable under an independent fee-shifting statute are analytically distinct. Thus, where an offer tracks CPLR 3221 and refers to “costs” without addressing attorney’s fees, Ramires forecloses the assumption that the reference to “costs,” by itself, necessarily encompasses or extinguishes an independently authorized statutory fee claim.


The decision, therefore, separates three questions that can easily be conflated: What claims does the offer resolve? What “costs” does CPLR 3221 attach to the offer? And does some independent source of law authorize attorney’s fees? Ramires teaches that the answer to the second question does not necessarily answer the third. A substantive fee-shifting statute can continue to operate even after an offer under CPLR 3221 has been accepted, unless the governing law or the terms of the offer eliminate that entitlement.


That is the larger lesson of Ramires. The Court of Appeals did more than decide whether these plaintiffs could pursue an additional $205,800 in attorney’s fees after accepting a $150,000 offer. It clarified the architecture of CPLR 3221. The rule creates its own settlement mechanism, uses “costs” in a meaning informed by its own drafting history, and does not silently absorb independent statutory rights to attorney’s fees. Neither the federal treatment of Rule 68 nor principles developed in the context of negotiated settlements can displace that statutory framework.


Accordingly, Ramires should be understood as establishing a distinctly New York approach to offers to compromise. CPLR 3221 may resemble Rule 68 in purpose and operation, but its consequences must be determined from the New York statute, its legislative history (where appropriate), the substantive law creating the underlying rights, and the language of the particular offer. That is a much more consequential holding than a dispute over the meaning of a single word. It determines what rights are actually surrendered when a CPLR 3221 offer is accepted and, just as importantly, what rights survive.

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Jeffrey M. Haber is a partner and co-founder of Freiberger Haber LLP.


This article is for informational purposes only and is not intended to be, and should not be, taken as legal advice.


Unless otherwise stated, Freiberger Haber LLP’s articles are based on recently decided published opinions or litigation releases and not on matters handled by the firm.

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[1] See CPLR 5519 (a)(2).


[2] 227 A.D.3d 1014, 1014 (2d Dept. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1986).


[3] Id. at 1015 (internal quotation marks omitted).


[4] Id.


[5] Slip Op. at *1.


[6] Id., quoting 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller CPLR Manual § 21.13 (internal quotation marks omitted).


[7] CPLR 3221.


[8] Slip Op. at * 1, quoting Commonwealth of N. Mariana Is. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 21 N.Y.3d 55, 60 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583 (1998).


[9] Id., quoting Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 37 N.Y.3d 107, 113 (2021), quoting Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208 (1976).


[10] Id.


[11] Id., quoting Commonwealth of N. Mariana Is., 21 N.Y.3d at 60; see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74.


[12] Id.


[13] Id. at *2 (orig’l emphasis), quoting First Preliminary Report of Advisory Comm. on Prac. and Proc., at 112 (1957).


[14] Id., citing Fifth Preliminary Report of Advisory Comm. on Prac. and Proc., at 507-508 (1961).


[15] Id., citing id. at 508.


[16] Id.


[17] Id., citing 473 U.S. 1 (1985).


[18] Marek, 473 U.S. at 5.


[19] Id. at 9.


[20] Slip Op. at *2, quoting Marek, 473 U.S. at 9.


[21] Marek, 473 U.S. at 7-8.


[22] Id. at 8.


[23] Id.


[24] Slip Op. at *2, citing Marek, 473 U.S. at 8-9 (emphasis added).


[25] Marek, 473 U.S. at 9.


[26] Slip Op. at *2.


[27] Id.


[28] Id., citing, for example, Gaisi v. Gaisi, 48 A.D.3d 744, 744 (2d Dept. 2008).


[29] Id.


[30] Id.


[31] Id., quoting City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 262-263 (1971).


[32] See Labor Law §§ 198 (1-a)-(1-b), (1-d); 663 (1).


[33] Slip Op. at *2.

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